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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the issue of cost-efficiency in Switzerland’s nursing homes, an issue of 
concern to policy makers because of the rapid growth of elderly care expenditure and the 
aging of the population. The fact that nursing homes in Switzerland exist in different 
institutional forms, private for-profit, government and non-profit status, raises the issue of 
their relative cost efficiency.  A panel data of 17 public and 19 nonprofit nursing homes 
operating over the 9-year period from 1993 to 2001, in one of the 26 Swiss cantons, Ticino, is 
studied.  Ticino’s nursing homes are heavily regulated and monitored by the canton’s 
authorities. However, given that in public firms there are more bureaucratic constraints and 
agency problems, one can expect a relatively low level of cost-efficiency. In this paper the 
effect of institutional form on efficiency is studied using a translog stochastic cost-frontier 
model. Several specifications are used to study the robustness of the results. The results 
suggest that the institutional form influences the efficiency of the studied nursing homes in 
that non-profit foundations are likely to be more cost-efficient than the nursing homes 
operated by government administration. The results also suggest that a great majority of the 
nursing homes in the sample do not fully benefit from the scale economies. This implies that 
efficiency gains can be obtained with larger capacities or joint operations.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Switzerland is a federal state composed of 26 cantons and approximately 3,000 
municipalities.1 The federal state is characterized by a high degree of decentralization in the 
provision of public services. Article 3 of the Federal Constitution grants large autonomy to 
individual cantons in the sectors, such as health and social care, which are not directly 
regulated by the constitution. For instance, individual cantons are independent in the 
organization and regulation of the provision of long-term care for elderly people. While in 
most cases the provision of this service is organized at the cantonal level, some cantons such 
as Ticino considered in this analysis, decentralize the task to “communes” (local 
                                                 
1  Three cantons further divided into semi -cantons. The most populated canton is Zurich with a population of 1.2 
million and the smallest one is Appenzell Interrhoden with slightly more than 15,000 inhabitants.  
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governments). The autonomy of the cantons creates a strong heterogeneity in the organization 
and regulation of the nursing home sector in Switzerland.   
Generally the long-term care for the elderly is provided by non-profit nursing homes 
and private for-profit nursing homes.2 Non-profit nursing homes can be further distinguishes 
in private and public nursing homes. From the institutional point of view, private non-profit 
nursing homes are generally foundations, whereas public nursing homes are so called 
“Municipalizzate”, e.g. firms without an own juridical status integrated directly in the local 
public administration. However, in few cases, local governments have chosen to create also a 
foundation to run their own nursing homes. In theses cases, these types of public nursing 
homes are generally, more independent from the local political and public administration 
process than nursing homes directly included in the public administration. This mixed 
economy raises the interesting issue of the effects of different ownership and institutional 
forms on costs.   
A number of recent studies have compared the cost efficiency of non-profit and for-
profit hospitals and nursing homes.3 However, little empirical analysis has been done in the 
comparison of cost efficiency between public and private nonprofit nursing homes. In this 
paper we test the hypothesis that nursing homes operated by private nonprofit are more 
efficient than those managed by local governments. This hypothesis is based on the 
conjuncture that the managers in public organizations are faced with more bureaucratic 
constraints than those in private non-profit foundations. Moreover, compared to government 
employees, the managers in non-profit organizations have more intrinsic motivations to have 
a more efficient performance. Finally, as we see later in the paper the agency problems in a 
public organization are likely to occur in a higher number of levels and with more friction 
than in non-profit foundations.  
For this purpose we estimate a cost function using data from a sample of 36 nonprofit 
nursing homes (public and private) operating in Ticino, a Swiss canton with a population of 
approximately 300,000 and an area size of 2,812 square km. Ticino is chosen because the 
planning of its new nursing homes is on the government’s agenda and therefore there is a 
need to determine the nursing home’s optimal capacity and the preferable ownership and 
organizational form. Moreover, Ticino’s nursing homes can be considered as a relatively 
                                                 
2  In Switzerland, nursing homes provide social care services as well as health care services to their patients. In 
fact, the residents’ average dependency and their need for medical care have been substantially rising during the 
last 15 years. Virtually all nursing homes have adapted the training of their staff and their infrastructure to 
provide health care services to their patients.  
3  See for example Vitaliano et al. (1994), Bradford and Mobley (1997) and McKay (1988). 
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uniform sample regarding the quality of services as well as the financial incentives of their 
managers. Finally, Ticino’s cantonal administration regularly collects data from all the 
nursing homes operating in the canton and the data collected over the past years allow a panel 
data analysis. The hypothesis is tested using a two-stage methodology. In the first stage the 
nursing homes’ inefficiency scores are estimated using a cost model specification without 
controlling for organizational form. The estimated results are analyzed in a second stage to 
test for a significant difference between the two types. The cost frontier model used in the first 
stage is based on the random-effects model. Two specifications are used to study the effect of 
potential biases due to the endogeneity of the quality of care.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the organization of the nursing 
home sector in Canton Ticino. A discussion on efficiency and institutional form is given in 
section 3. Section 4 discusses the cost model and its econometric specification. Section 5 
presents the data, while section 6 illustrates the empirical results. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. The organization of the nursing home sector in Ticino 
The nursing home sector in canton Ticino, with 67 homes, represents an important 
element of the social care sector for elderly people. The most important characteristics of this 
sector are as follows:  
· A variety of institutional forms operate in the market; 
· The market is heavily regulated by the state; 
· The state provides a large financial support in the form of subsidies.4  
In Ticino, as well as in other Swiss cantons, there are different institutional forms 
operating in the nursing home sector, i.e. private for-profit nursing homes, non-profit private 
institutions and public institutions. Crivelli, Filippini and Lunati (2002) provide a detailed 
description of different organization types in Switzerland’s nursing homes and their 
distribution across cantons. In all Swiss cantons there is a clear majority of non-profit nursing 
homes (i.e. public and private non-profit institutions). However, in some cantons there are 
more public institutions and in others more non-profit private institutions. Among 67 Ticino’s 
nursing homes, 24 are public, 32 are operated by private non-profit foundations, 6 are non-
profit foundations created by municipalities, and 5 are private for-profit. The organizational 
structure of different nursing homes is discussed in the next section. The for-profit sector 
 5 
accounts for about 5 percent of the nursing home beds in Ticino. For-profit nursing homes are 
not considered in this study. 5  
Ticino’s nursing homes are therefore dominated by non-profit and public firms that are 
strongly regulated and subsidized by the government. Economists generally regard 
competitive markets as the best way to promote an efficient allocation of resources. However, 
they recognize that there are circumstances where competitive markets fail to bring about an 
optimal allocation of resources. Three basic arguments for market failure in the nursing home 
industry are: (1) the local natural monopoly argument, which is typical of nursing homes in 
peripheral areas, (2) the lack of comprehensive information on the quality of care for the users 
of residential services and (3) the merit goods argument. In the latter case the state considers 
the services provided by nursing homes to be a merit good and therefore it recognizes the 
need to give them a financial contribution through the general fiscal system and to regulate 
their tariffs. For these reasons Ticino’s government has adopted the following forms of 
regulation: approval of the daily rates, definition of the minimum necessary infrastructure and 
staff requirements, control of the supply capacity in terms of beds, and concession of a 
financial contribution in the form of subsidies to public and non-profit nursing homes.  
The regulation of the nursing homes in Ticino has shown at least three consequences:  
· The subsidized price of residential care results in a significant increase in demand. The 
subsidized daily rates give families an incentive to transfer the burden of care of their 
elderly relatives to the state thus creating an excessive demand.  
· To counteract this demand excess, the state controls the supply side by erecting barriers to 
entry to the market. For instance, in order to get subsidies for operating costs and health 
insurance reimbursement for medical care, a nursing home has to figure in the nursing 
home planning of the canton.  
· The gap between supply and demand makes the use of a rationing tool necessary. In the 
case of Ticino this is represented by waiting lists.  
 
3. Institutional form and efficiency 
Property rights theory has often been used to compare the efficiency of private non-
profit organizations and for-profit firms. Following Alchian (1965) and Demsetz (1967), this 
theory postulates that for-profit firms provide a high-power incentive mechanism through 
                                                                                                                                                        
4  However, in the majority of the Swiss cantons only public nursing homes and non-profit nursing homes 
receive subsidies from the government. 
5  The data on for-profit nursing homes are not available to the authors. 
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clearly defined property rights. As residual claimants of the enterprise, owners have both the 
financial incentive and the means to induce an efficient performance in the firm. 6 The 
distinction between non-profit and public organizations is however more subtle. In principle, 
there is no significant difference in the property rights defined in public and non-profit 
organizations. These two organization types are similar in several aspects: First, the directors 
do not have any direct pecuniary gain from profits, but may have non-pecuniary benefits or 
perquisites. Secondly, in both types there are intrinsic motivations to work efficiently. These 
incentives may be driven by the organization’s mission, organizational culture and trust, and 
long-term career paths.7  One may argue however, that such motivations are more pronounced 
and clear in private non-profit foundations, driven by the very mission of those foundations.   
There are other theoretical arguments that public non-profit foundations have a more 
efficient performance than organizations operated directly by government administration. The 
first argument is derived from public choice theory. The basic idea of these models proposed 
by Niskanen (1968, 1971) is that the bureaucrats responsible for delivering a fixed amount of 
output with a budget, have a tendency to over-budget and to produce more bureaucratic output 
than is socially optimal. To reach this goal they have incentives to respond to the demands of 
the political process with its different distribution of power. For politicians the incentive is to 
shift costs and benefits so that the net benefits to their constituency are positive. This leads to 
a “political optimisation” which may conflict with cost efficiency. On the other hand, 
managers of non-profit nursing homes may likewise have no strong incentive to be efficient, 
since efficiency cannot be lawfully rewarded.  However, the incentive for these managers to 
be efficient may result from their personal satisfaction in providing a particular social service, 
which is likely to be stronger than their counterparts in the public sector.8  
Moreover, in the case of the Swiss nursing homes, the decision-making process of a 
non-profit foundation has more flexibility and not influenced by the politicians. In the case of 
a state-owned firm, the taxpayers are the owners of the firm and control the way the firm 
conducts its activities through their representatives in the parliament and in the government. 
These representatives are responsible for managing the company in order to maximize the 
social welfare. Public representatives in turn, delegate the authority to a commission which 
oversees the company’s management. Compared to nonprofit firms, public firms experience 
an attenuation of property rights resulting in a more significant reduction in incentives for the 
                                                 
6  The owners can solve at least theoretically, the agency problems by sharing the risks with the managers.  
7  See for instance DiIulio (1994) for the “principled” behavior of managers in public firms. 
8  See Weisbrod (1997) for an interesting presentation of the efficiency incentives of nonprofit organizations. 
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management to minimize costs and to follow the owner’s interests. Moreover, the agency 
problems within state-owned companies are more complex than those in the private sector. In 
the case of a for-profit or nonprofit private firm, the management itself answers only to the 
owners, and the employment relationship involves the management and the employees. In the 
public sector, the chain of command from the electorate to the management goes through the 
parliament, the government and the government-appointed commission responsible for state-
owned firms. Public firms involve many principal-agent relationships, and agency problems 
can arise at each stage. In the face of such agency problems monitoring managers is more 
difficult and the efficient performance is harder to achieve. Therefore, compared to non-profit 
firms, the state-operated firms are more likely to be away from efficiency. Moreover, the 
boards of directors in state-owned firms are often political appointments and represent 
political parties whose objectives may not be cost minimization. Private nonprofit firms are 
clearly less politicized than state-owned firms. Finally, the nursing homes created by local 
governments in form of foundations are also generally less influenced by the political process 
and experience less principal-agent relationships than the nursing homes included in the local 
administration. 
In this paper we study the effect of ownership and institutional form on the production 
cost using a sample of Ticino’s nursing homes. As discussed above, one can expect that 
nursing homes with different status are different regarding cost-efficiency. There are however, 
several problems that may complicate the empirical analysis: First, public and non-profit 
nursing homes may have different resident case-mixes thus different costs. Secondly, cost-
minimization is constrained by a minimum quality of care. It is not clear that public and non-
profit nursing homes have the same attitude towards quality. It is therefore necessary to 
control for the differences in quality and case-mix.  
 
4.  Methodology 
 A stochastic cost frontier approach is adopted in this paper. A frontier cost function 
defines minimum costs given output level, input prices and the existing production 
technology. Due to technical and allocative inefficiencies it is unlikely that all firms operate at 
the frontier. The main advantage of the stochastic cost frontier approach compared to the 
deterministic approach is the separation of the inefficiency effect from the statistical noise. 
The main approaches that can be used to estimate a frontier cost function with panel 
data are: Random effects model without inefficiency distribution restriction, Fixed effects 
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model and Random effects model with a restriction on the distribution of the inefficiency. 9 In 
this paper a random effects model with time-invariant inefficiency10 in line with the model 
proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) is considered.11 We 
excluded the fixed effects model because the inefficiency indicators estimated by this 
approach may contain relatively high estimation errors due to the incidental parameters 
problem. Moreover, we did not use the third approach because it imposes a distribution on the 
inefficiency indicators.12  
In order to study the effect of institutional type on cost efficiency, a two-stage 
method is used. In the first stage, the cost frontier is estimated and the nursing homes’ 
inefficiency scores are calculated. In the second stage the estimated inefficiency score are 
analyzed with respect to the nursing home’s type. Basically the sample is divided into two 
sub-samples: public and private non-profit nursing homes. The hypothesis that the 
inefficiency terms of the two sub-samples are from a single population is studied using 
Kruskal-Wallis test.13 Moreover, in a second step of this efficiency analysis we created two 
other sub-samples: nursing homes (public and private) operated by a foundation and public 
nursing homes integrated in the local administration. The advantage of the two-stage approach 
is that the effect of any time- invariant factor can be identified in the second stage. The 
analysis is performed with several specifications. This section provides a description of the 
cost frontier models and econometric specifications used in the paper.  
 
4.1.  Specification of the Frontier Cost Function 
A nursing home can be represented as a firm transforming two inputs into patient-days 
of residential health and social care for elderly people. Moreover, in the cost model 
specification we take into account a number of output characteristic variables, which should 
capture, at least partially, the heterogeneity and quality dimension of the output of a nursing 
home. Assuming that output and input prices are exogenous, and that (for a given technology)  
                                                 
9  See Battese (1992), Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Simar (1992) for general overviews of these methods. 
10  Notice that since the institutional form in our sample does not change over time, there is no need to consider 
models with time-variant inefficiency. 
11  Note however that unlike Pitt and Lee we do not assume any form of distribution on the random effects. See 
also Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for more details. 
12  For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches see Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000). 
13 See Singh and Coelli (2001) for an application of this test to compare the efficiency of Indian dairy plants in 
cooperative and private sectors. 
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firms choose input levels to minimize costs, the firm's total cost of operating a nursing home 
can be represented by the following cost function: 
),,,,,( tLK PPRQYfTC =      (1) 
where TC represents total annual cost and Y is the output represented by the total number of 
resident-days of the nursing home. PK and PL are respectively the prices of capital and 
labor.14 Q is the average dependency index calculated annually by the Regional Department 
of Public Health. This index measures the average required assistance of a given nursing 
home’s patients with normal daily activities such as eating, personal care or performing 
physiological functions. Q varies from 1 to 3, with 3 representing the most severe (dependent) 
case.  R is the nursing staff ratio, that is the ratio of the number of employed nurses in a 
nursing home to the number of nurses that should be employed according to the guidelines of 
the Regional Department of Public Health. 15 Since the nursing care is a labor- intensive 
service and the quality of care depends on the time spent by nurses for each patient, this 
variable represents the quality of output and the production process.16 Finally, t is a linear 
time trend that captures the changes in technical efficiency associated with technical progress.  
 Since the residents are assigned to the nursing homes by the canton’s authorities, 
variable Q can be considered as an exogenous output characteristic. However, noting that this 
variable is obtained from a more or less subjective evaluation of the required caring time for 
each patient, one may as well argue that different nursing homes may have different 
evaluation or reporting criteria. Estimations would be biased should one type of nursing 
homes systematically over-report the dependency of their residents. To avoid any potential 
bias, we consider an alternative specification in which the dependency variable is excluded 
from the cost function.  
It is generally assumed that the cost function given in (1) is the result of cost 
minimization given input prices and output and should therefore satisfy certain properties.17 
Mainly, this function must be non-decreasing, concave, linearly homogeneous in input prices 
and non-decreasing in output. To estimate the cost function (1), a translog functional form is 
employed. This flexible functional form is a local, second-order approximation to any 
arbitrary cost function. It places no a priori restrictions on the elasticity of substitution and 
                                                 
14  For a similar cost model specification see Filippini (2001). However, Filippini (2001) uses a smaller data set  
(38 nursing homes over the period 1993-1995) and did not estimate a cost frontier model. 
15  These guidelines are only recommendations and the nursing homes are not required to exactly follow them.  
16  See Cohen and Spector (1996) and McKay (1988) for a similar approach when considering some measures 
of quality in a cost model for nursing homes. Cohen and Spector measured quality of care by case-mix adjusted 
staff to resident ratios. McKay used “nursing hours per patient” to measure the nursing home’s quality.   
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allows the economies of scale to vary with the output level.18 The translog approximation to 
(1) can be written as:  
 
2222
0
lnlnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
)(ln
2
1
)(ln
2
1
)(ln
2
1
)(ln
2
1
lnlnlnln)ln(
itiit
K
L
LRit
K
L
LQ
ititQRitityRitityQ
K
L
ityL
itRRitQQ
K
L
LLityy
K
L
LitRitQity
K
it
vuR
P
P
Q
P
P
RQRYQY
P
P
Y
RQ
P
P
Y
P
P
RQY
P
TC
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
+++++
++++
++++
++++=
taaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaaa
t
 (2) 
 
   with   i= 1, 2, ...., N   and    t = 1,2,…,T 
 
where ui is a positive one-sided disturbance capturing the effect of inefficiency and vit is a 
random error term vit. Note that by normalizing total costs and input prices by one of the 
input prices, we impose the theoretical condition of linear homogeneity in input prices. The 
other theoretical restrictions are verified after the estimation. In particular, the concavity of 
the estimated cost function reflects the fact that the cost function is a result of cost 
minimization. However, this assumption may be unrealistic for public and non-profit firms 
especially in sectors like health care, where other factors like quality may be as important as 
cost considerations. However, in the spirit of Bös (1986), we contend that although the 
functions based on cost optimization may not be consistent with the actual objectives of 
certain firms, they can still be used as a “behavioral” cost functions and can be helpful in 
studying the behavior of such firms.19    
 
5.  Data 
The data set used in this paper is prepared based on the annual accounting reports of 
36 nursing homes in canton Ticino over the 9-year period from 1993 to 2001. The sample 
includes more than two thirds of Ticino’s nursing homes. The sample includes 14 private non-
profit homes, 5 public non-profit foundations and 17 public institutions. Ticino has a few for-
profit nursing homes which are excluded from this study. All the nursing homes in the sample 
                                                                                                                                                        
17  For more details on the functional form of the cost function see Cornes (1992), p.106. 
18  Translog functional form requires that the underlying cost function be approximated around a specific point. 
In our case this point is taken as the median of all variables. Therefore, all independent variables are normalized 
by their median. 
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provide inpatient services.20 There are four missing observations in 1993, leaving a total of 
320 observations. The variables include total costs, total number of employees (in terms of 
full-time equivalent units), average wage per employee per year, total number of beds and 
total number of resident-days. Other characteristics are ownership form (pub lic/non-profit) of 
the nursing home, the number of external apartment beds maintained by the home and the 
number of caring personnel working for the nursing home.  
Total cost is taken as the total annual expenditures of the nursing home. Output is 
measured in total number of patient-days of the nursing home. Average yearly wage rates are 
estimated as the weighted mean of the average wage rates of different professional categories 
working in a nursing home, including nurses, administrative and technical staff and 
physicians. Following Friedlaender and Wang Chiang (1983), Filippini and Maggi (1993), 
and Filippini (2001), the capital price is calculated from the residual costs divided by the 
capital stock. Residual cost is total cost minus labor cost. Similar to Wagstaff (1989), the 
capital stock is approximated by the number of beds operated by the nursing home.21 The 
quality indicators, Q and R, (as described earlier) are calculated annually by the regional 
Department of Public Health. The summary statistics of some of the main variables used in 
the analysis are given in table 1. All money values are converted to 2000 Swiss Francs using 
the global consumer price index.  
As it can be seen in the table, there is a high variation in the costs of a patient-day 
care. The input prices show a great amount of variation as well. Part of these variations is 
associated with time variation. For instance the average cost of a patient-day care has 
increased from about 154 Francs in 1993 to 214 Francs in 2001. In the same period, the price 
of labor has increased about 15 percent in real terms and our measure of real capital price has 
increased about 20 percent. However, the organizational type of the nursing homes has not 
changed in our sample.  
Table 2 lists means and standard deviations of the main variables by organizational 
type. This table also reports the results of Kruskal-Wallis test and one sided t-test, that gives 
an indication of the statistical significance of the differences between public and non-profit 
nursing homes. The first observation on table 2 is that the non-profit nursing homes are on 
average more costly and smaller than the public ones. This result however, does not bear any 
                                                                                                                                                        
19  See Bös (1986), page 343. 
20  There are some nursing homes that offer the possibility of nursing care in external residential apartments. 
The nursing care of this type is less intensive (thus less costly) than the care given to the home’s residents. For 
this reason we excluded four nursing homes whose share of external beds is more than 10 percent of their total 
beds.  
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conclusion on cost-efficiency. For instance, as it can be seen in the table, public homes have 
access to a relatively lower capital price. Public nursing homes may have access to more 
governmental subsidies for equipments and buildings. Moreover, the patients’ case mix in 
non-profit nursing homes is on average more “dependent”, thus more costly. Given that the 
patients are assigned to the nursing homes mainly based on proximity criteria, this finding 
may seem surprising.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (320 observations) 
 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Total annual costs per 
resident-day (SFr) 
 
184.05 
 
28.92 
 
183.10 
 
111.85 
 
279.81 
 
Total annual resident-
days (Y) 
 
 
23175.7 
 
 
9684.4 
 
 
21482 
 
 
6525 
 
 
58324 
 
Number of beds 
 
66.23 
 
26.81 
 
61 
 
28 
 
162 
 
Average labor price 
(PL) in SFr per 
employee per year  
 
 
 
70157.4 
 
 
 
6586.4 
 
 
 
70280.1 
 
 
 
29744.3 
 
 
 
122950.2 
 
Average capital price 
(PK) in SFr per bed 
 
 
11008.3 
 
 
2579.1 
 
 
10714.1 
 
 
3465.8 
 
 
22426.3 
 
Average dependency 
index (Q) 
 
 
2.575 
 
 
.219 
 
 
2.6 
 
 
1.87 
 
 
3 
 
Nursing staff ratio (R) 
 
.963 
 
.124 
 
.97 
 
.49 
 
1.55 
 
Non-Profit (NP) 
 
 
.531 
 
.500 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
- All monetary values are in 2000 Swiss Francs (CHF), adjusted for inflation by Switzerland’s  
  global consumer price index. 
 
A more careful look at the differences shows that on average, the non-profit 
foundations created by municipalities have the most dependent cases and public nursing 
homes have the least dependent case-mix. These differences may be related to demographic 
variations and health status of different locations in the canton. However, such a contrasting 
difference may also be at least partly, due to the variations in reporting dependency index by 
nursing homes to canton’s authorities. If a group of nursing homes systematically over-report 
                                                                                                                                                        
21  A more precise estimation of capital stock would require capital inventory data, which are not available to us. 
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the severity of their case-mix, this may create a bias in the estimation of cost-efficiency. In 
order to identify the extent of such potential biases, an additional specification without control 
for severity is used. Comparing the results between the model with and without severity can 
help determine the direction of this bias.  
 
Table 2. Means of the main variables by organizational type  
 
 Mean  
(Standard Deviation) 
P-value  
One-sided t-test 
 Private 
Foundations 
Public 
Foundations 
Public 
Administration 
 
Public vs 
Private 
Foundations vs 
Public 
Administration 
 
Total annual costs 
per resident-day 
(SFr) 
 
187.0 
(33.6) 
 
186.5 
(31.0) 
 
180.9 
(23.3) 
 
.075 
 
0.033* 
 
Total annual 
resident-days (Y) 
 
19,592 
(7,802) 
 
18,640 
(5,544) 
 
27,523 
(10,249) 
 
.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
Number of beds 
 
55.8 
(22.2) 
 
55.4 
(17.7) 
 
78.2 
(27.7) 
 
.0000** 
 
0.0000** 
 
Average labor 
price (PL) in SFr 
per employee per 
year  
 
 
69,168 
(8585) 
 
 
71,275 
(5,955) 
 
 
70,647 
(4,430) 
 
 
.016* 
 
 
0.106 
 
Average capital 
price (PK) in SFr 
per bed 
 
12,718 
(2,593) 
 
10,180 
(1,918) 
 
9,832 
(1,873) 
 
.0000** 
 
.0000** 
 
Average 
dependency index 
(Q) 
 
2.58 
(.21) 
 
2.65 
(.25) 
 
2.54 
(.21) 
 
.27 
 
0.008** 
 
Nursing staff ratio 
(R) 
 
.963 
(.144) 
 
.927 
(.129) 
 
.975 
(.101) 
 
.48 
 
0.062 
 
Share of total 
resident-days (%) 
Share of beds (%) 
# of observations 
# of homes 
 
 
33.0 
32.9 
125 
14 
 
 
11.3 
11.8 
45 
5 
 
 
55.7 
55.3 
150 
17 
  
 
-  Standard deviations are given in brackets.  
- * means that the difference (between public and non-profit groups) is significant at lower than 5% 
significance level. ** means the significance level is less than 1%. 
- All monetary values are in 2000 Swiss Francs (CHF), adjusted for inflation by Switzerland’s global 
consumer price index. 
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6.  Estimation results 
 The estimated parameters of the cost frontier are listed in table 3. Model I is according 
to equation 2. In model II the average dependency index (Q) is excluded from the explanatory 
variables. This specification is used to study the extent to which the differences between two 
types of nursing homes are due to their different resident case-mixes.  
 
Table 3. Estimated coefficients 
 
 Model I Model II 
ay .890 
(.017) 
.822 
(.021) 
aQ .555 
(.083) 
_ 
aR .382 
(.046) 
.256 
(.045) 
aL .832 
(.025) 
.816 
(.026) 
ayy -.024 
(.053) 
-.112 
(.059) 
aQQ -.558 
(.900) 
_ 
aLL .612 
(.075) 
.576 
(.078) 
ayQ -.011 
(.12) 
_ 
ayL -.00006 
(.042) 
-.016 
(.042) 
aLQ .034 
(.17) 
_ 
aRR -.113 
(.214) 
-.276 
(.216) 
ayR .223 
(.098) 
.296 
(.099) 
aLR .348 
(.12) 
.325 
(.121) 
aQR -.587 
(.34) 
_ 
at  .012 
(.0022) 
.024 
(.0017) 
Constant 15.15 
(.013) 
15.10 
(.014) 
R-square .9754 .9607 
 
- Standard errors are given in brackets.  
- The sample includes 320 observations (36 nursing homes) 
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The regression results show that all the first-order terms are significant and in a 
reasonable direction. As expected, output and prices have a positive effect on costs, and the 
nursing homes with a more severe case-mix and/or with a higher quality of service are 
relatively more costly.22 Since total cost and the regressors are in logarithms and have been 
normalized, the first order coefficients are interpretable as cost elasticities evaluated at the 
sample median. The output elasticity is positive and implies that an increase in the supply will 
increase total cost. A 1% increase in the number of patient-days of nursing home care will 
increase the total cost by approximately 0.9% (Model I), 0.8% (Model II), respectively. 
The cost elasticities with respect to the output characteristics variables, Q and R, are 
positive and imply that an increase in the average required assistance of a home’s patients or 
an increase in the ratio of the number of nurses employed by a nursing home and the number 
of nurses that should theoretically be employed will increase total cost. 
The coefficient of the linear trend suggests that the total costs have increased over 
time with a rate of about 1 to 2 percent per year. The  growth of costs is a commonly observed 
phenomenon in labor- intensive industries such as health care, which usually face a persistent 
growth of labor price. The estimated cost functions do not however satisfy the concavity 
condition in input prices.23 This may suggest that the estimated cost functions are not resulted 
from a complete cost-minimization strategy. Therefore, these results should be interpreted in 
the behavioral cost framework proposed by Bös (1986). 
 
Cost-efficiency, ownership and institutional form 
Table 4 provides a summary of the estimated inefficiency measures for three groups of 
nursing homes. The inefficiency score is defined as exp(ui), where ui is the inefficiency term 
obtained from the regression model. These measures represent the ratio of a nursing home’s 
actual costs to a minimum level that would have been achieved had the firm operated as cost-
efficient as the “best practice” observed in the sample. Comparing the two specifications, with 
and without average dependency index, indicates that part of the difference between different 
nursing homes is related to the residents case-mix.  When the dependency is not taken into 
account, model II predicts that the non-profit homes are on average 7 percent more cost-
efficient (second column). However, when the differences in case-mix are controlled for, this 
difference reduces to about 3 percent (first column).  
                                                 
22  These findings are in line with the results obtained by Filippini (2001). 
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As expected, the inefficiency estimates obtained from model II are higher than those 
of model I. The exclusion of variable Q from the model specification increases the value of 
the composed error terms and also the inefficiency term. The inefficiency scores obtained 
from model II can therefore be overestimated. The results obtained from model I show 
relatively low values of inefficiency indicators. This means that the nursing homes included in 
our sample are comparatively efficient.  
 
Table 4. Inefficiency measures:  
 
  Model I Model II 
Mean 1.07 1.21 
St. Deviation .038 .089 
1st quartile 1.05 1.19 
Median 1.07 1.23 
Pr
iv
at
e 
Fo
un
da
tio
ns
 
3rd quartile 1.09 1.26 
Mean 1.08 1.23 
St. Deviation .054 .13 
1st quartile 1.10 1.23 
Median 1.10 1.28 
Pu
bl
ic
 F
ou
nd
at
io
ns
 
3rd quartile 1.13 1.30 
Mean 1.10 1.28 
St. Deviation .028 .057 
1st quartile 1.03 1.13 
Median 1.08 1.15 
Pu
bl
ic
 
A
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
3rd quartile 1.12 1.36 
     
-  Inefficiency measures represent the ratio of a nursing home’s actual costs  
   to minimum costs from the best practice in the sample. 
 
The results of Kruskal-Wallis test on the differences in inefficiency scores between 
different groups are given in table 5. The results are in general robust to specification in the 
sense that the comparative cost-efficiency of different types of nursing homes does not 
                                                                                                                                                        
23  Our results indicate that the Hessian matrix of the estimated cost function with respect to input prices (labor 
and capital) is not negative semi-definite, thus the concavity condition is not satisfied in any of the 
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depend on their reported case-mix severity. These results suggest that private nursing homes 
are on average, slightly more cost-efficient than the homes owned by governments. Moreover, 
the foundations, regardless of whether they are owned by public or private sector, are slightly 
more cost-efficient than the nursing homes integrated in the local public administration.24  
Foundations, perhaps due to a relatively low influence of the political and bureaucratic 
process on the management, seem to be an interesting institutional form even for public 
nursing homes. The Kruskal-Wallis tests results (not shown here) do not indicate any 
significant difference between public foundations and private non-profit nursing homes. 
However, because of the relatively low number of public foundations in our sample, this 
result may be due to estimation errors.  
 
Table 5. Kruskal-Wallis test results:  
   P-value 
Model I 
P-value 
Model II 
More efficient 
group 
Public vs Private .021 .056 Private Homes 
Foundations vs Public 
Administration 
.011 .032 Foundations 
 
 
Scale economies 
Scale efficiency indicates the degree to which a company is producing at optimal 
scale. Frisch (1965) defines the optimal scale as the level of operation where the scale 
elasticity is equal to one. Returns to scale (RS) is defined as the proportional increase in total 
cost resulting from a proportional increase in output (Y), holding all input prices and output 
characteristic variables fixed. This is equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of total cost 
with respect to the output (Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway 1984). The returns to scale can 
therefore be obtained from:  
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
¶
¶
=
Y
TC
RS
ln
ln
1              (3) 
                                                                                                                                                        
specifications.  
24 This result is consistent with the findings reported in Crivelli and Filippini (2002) who used a different 
sample of Ticino’s nursing homes and a different methodology. 
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There are increasing returns to scale if RS is greater than 1, and conversely, there are 
decreasing returns to scale if RS is below 1. In the case of RS = 1 we have a constant returns 
to scale situation. Economies of scale exist if the average costs of a nursing home decrease as 
output increases. Table 5 shows the values of RS calculated for representative nursing homes 
of our sample.25  The results are given only for the main specification with control for 
dependency index (model I).26   
 
Table 6. Returns to scale (RS):  
 
Representative 
Nursing Home 
Size (Number 
of Beds) 
Resident-days per 
Year 
Returns to scale 
(RS) 
1st Quartile 47 15,740 1.134 
(.030) 
Median 61 21,480 1.124 (.021) 
3rd Quartile  80 28,790 1.116 
(.029) 
Maximum 162 58,320 1.032 (.060) 
 
- Standard errors are given in brackets.  
- Only specification I is considered. 
 
The estimated values of returns to scale range from a minimum of about 1 for the largest 
nursing home to a maximum of 1.3 for the smallest one.  The results suggest that a great 
majority of the nursing homes in our sample do not fully exploit the scale economies. This is 
an important policy implication that is worth considering especially, in the organization of 
some of these nursing homes that operate in the same area, but are operated by different 
municipalities.   
 
7. Discussion and conclusions  
This paper considers the estimation of a translog cost function for a sample of 36 
Swiss nursing homes in canton Ticino using panel data for a mine-year period from 1993 to 
2001. A random effects stochastic frontier model is considered. The results of this analysis 
                                                 
25  Equation (3) has been evaluated at the corresponding input prices and output characteristics variables, Q and 
R. For instance the median of all variables is used to estimate the returns to scale for the “median” nursing home. 
26  The results obtained from the alternative specification II are in general very close to the reported results.  
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suggest that government nursing homes have slightly higher costs than non-profit nursing 
homes when other factors are taken into consideration. The results also suggest that in terms 
of efficiency, the non-profit foundations created by municipalities are rather similar to private 
non-profit nursing homes than the nursing homes operated by public administration. This 
finding is robust to the model specification. The sources of these cost differences are not 
clear. The results suggest however that the foundations created by local governments can be 
almost as efficient as private non-profit nursing homes. The relatively low efficiency of the 
nursing homes integrated in the public administration can therefore be explained by their 
strong bureaucratic constraints. However, we have to point out that these cost differences are 
limited to a few percentage points. 
Finally, this paper provides empirical evidence for the presence of economies of scale 
at most output levels in Ticino’s nursing homes. The results suggest that efficiency gains can 
be obtained from merging smaller nursing homes operating in the same area. Theoretically, 
economies of scale may also be obtained through partial mergers. For instance in many cases, 
savings may be obtained through joint purchase of food and medical supplies or by sharing 
some clinical and administrative functions. Nursing homes may also be able to reduce capital 
costs thanks to the ability of large businesses to negotiate lower interest rates. Further, the 
empirical results indicate that the economies of scale should be taken into account for 
planning the size of new nursing homes. However, it should be noted that because of 
relatively limited opportunities for human contacts, the quality of service can be low in 
excessively large nursing homes. This is an important factor that must be considered in the 
evaluation of a merger strategy. 
 
References 
Alchian, A. A. (1965),  “Some economics of property rights”, Il Politico, 30 (4): 816-829. 
Battese, G. E. (1992) “Frontier Production Functions and Technical Efficiency: A Survey of 
Empirical Applications in Agricultural Economics”, Agricultural Economics, 7, 185-208. 
Bös, D. (1986)  Public Enterprise Economics, Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
Bradford, W.D. and L.R. Mobley (1997), “Behavioural differences among hospitals: It is 
ownership or location?”, Applied economics, 29, 1125-1138. 
Caves, W.C., L.R. Christensen and M.W. Tretheway (1984), “Economies of Density versus 
Economies of scale: Why trunk and Local Service Airlaine Costs Differ”, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 15, 471-489.  
Cohen, J. and W.D Spector (1996), “The effect of Medicaid Reimbursement on Quality of 
Care in Nursing Homes”, Journal of Health Economics, 15, 23-48. 
 20 
Cornes, R. (1992), Duality and Modern Economics, Cambridge University Press. 
Crivelli, L., M. Filippini and D. Lunati (2002) “Regulation, ownership and efficiency in the 
Swiss nursing home industry”, International Journal of Health Care Finance and 
Economics, 2 (2): 79-97. 
Crivelli, L. and M. Filippini (2002), “Institutional organisation and cost performance: 
Evidence from the nursing home industry”, in: Plural Economy and Socio-economic 
Regulation, Enjolras B. and M-L. von Bergmann-Winberg (eds), Napoli: 24th International 
Congress of CIRIEC, 165-176. 
Demsetz, H. (1967) “Towards a theory of property rights”, American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings, 57: 346-359.  
DiIolio, Jr. John D. (1994), “Principled agents: the cultural bases of behavior in a federal 
government bureaucracy”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 3: 277-
318. 
Filippini, M. (2001) “Economies of scale in the Swiss nursing home industry”, Applied 
Economics Letters, 8: 43-46. 
Filippini, M. and R. Maggi (1993), “Efficiency and Regulation in the Case of the Swiss 
Private Railways”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 5, 199-216. 
Friedlaender, A.F. and S.J.Wang Chiang (1983), “Productivity Growth in the Regulated 
Trucking Industry”, Research in Transportation and Economics, 1, 149-184. 
Frisch, R. (1965) Theory of Production, Dordrecht, 1965. 
Kumbhakar, Subal C. and C. A. Knox Lovell (2000)  Stochastic Frontier Analysis, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
McKay, N.L. (1988), “An Econometric Analysis of Costs and Scale Economies in the 
Nursing Home Industry”, Journal of Human Resources, 23, 57-75. 
Niskanen W.A. (1971), Bureacracy and Representative Government, Chicago, Aldine 
Atherton. 
Niskanen W.A. (1968), ‘The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy’, American Economic 
Review, 42, 239-305. 
Pitt, M. and L. Lee (1981) “The measurement and sources of technical inefficiency in 
Indonesian weaving industry”, Journal of Development Economics, 9: 43-64. 
Schmidt, P. and R.E. Sickles, (1984), Production Frontiers and Panel Data, Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics, 2, 367-374. 
Simar, L., (1992), ‘Estimating Efficiencies from Frontier Models with Panel Data: A 
Comparison of Parametric, Non-parametric and Semi-parametric Methods with 
Bootstapping’, The Journal of Productivity Analysis, 3, 171-203. 
 21 
Singh, Satbir and Tim Coelli (2001)  “Performance of dairy plants in the cooperative and 
private sectors in India”,  Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 72 (4): 453-479. 
Vitaliano, D.F. and M. Toren (1994), “Cost and efficiency in nursing homes: a stochastic 
frontier approach”, Journal of Health economics, 13 , 281-300. 
Wagstaff, A. (1989), “Estimating Efficiency in the Hospital Sector: a Comparison of Three 
Statistical Cost Frontier Models”, Applied Economics, 21, 659-672. 
Weisbrod B.A., (1997) ‘The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: its Entwining with private 
Enterprise and Government', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16, pp. 541-
555. 
 
 
 
QUADERNI DELLA FACOLTÀ 
 
 
 
I quaderni sono richiedibili (nell’edizione a stampa) alla Biblioteca universitaria di Lugano 
via G. Buffi 13  CH 6900 Lugano 
e-mail: biblioteca@lu.unisi.ch 
 
The working papers (printed version) may be obtained by contacting the Biblioteca universitaria di 
Lugano 
via G. Buffi 13  CH 6900 Lugano 
e-mail: biblioteca@lu.unisi.ch 
 
 
 
Quaderno n. 98-01 
P. Balestra, Efficient (and parsimonious) estimation of structural dynamic error 
component models 
 
Quaderno n. 99-01 
M. Filippini, Cost and scale efficiency in the nursing home sector : evidence from 
Switzerland  
 
Quaderno n. 99-02 
L. Bernardi, I sistemi tributari di oggi : da dove vengono e dove vanno 
 
Quaderno n. 99-03 
L.L. Pasinetti, Economic theory and technical progress 
 
Quaderno n. 99-04 
G. Barone -Adesi, K. Giannopoulos, L. Vosper, VaR without correlations for portfolios 
of derivative securities 
 
Quaderno n. 99-05 
G. Barone-Adesi, Y. Kim, Incomplete information and the closed-end fund discount  
 
Quaderno n. 99-06 
G. Barone -Adesi, W. Allegretto, E. Dinenis, G. Sorwar, Valuation of derivatives based 
on CKLS interest rate models 
 
Quaderno n. 99-07 
M. Filippini, R. Maggi, J. Mägerle , Skalenerträge und optimale Betriebsgrösse bei den 
schweizerische Privatbahnen 
 
Quaderno n. 99-08 
E. Ronchetti, F. Trojani, Robust inference with GMM estimators 
 
Quaderno n. 99-09 
G.P. Torricelli, I cambiamenti strutturali dello sviluppo urbano e regionale in Svizzera e 
nel Ticino sulla base dei dati dei censimenti federali delle aziende 1985, 1991 e 1995 
 
Quaderno n. 00-01 
E. Barone, G. Barone-Adesi, R. Masera, Requisiti patrimoniali, adeguatezza del 
capitale e gestione del rischio  
 
Quaderno n. 00-02 
G. Barone-Adesi, Does volatility pay? 
 
Quaderno n. 00-03 
G. Barone-Adesi, Y. Kim, Incomplete information and the closed-end fund discount 
 
Quaderno n. 00-04 
R. Ineichen, Dadi, astragali e gli inizi del calcolo delle probabilità  
 
Quaderno n. 00-05 
W. Allegretto, G. Barone-Adesi, E. Dinenis, Y. Lin, G. Sorwar, A new approach to 
check the free boundary of single factor interest rate put option 
 
Quaderno n. 00-06 
G.D.Marangoni,  The Leontief Model and Economic Theory 
 
Quaderno n. 00-07 
B. Antonioli, R, Fazioli, M. Filippini, Il servizio di igiene urbana italiano tra 
concorrenza e monopolio 
 
Quaderno n. 00-08 
L. Crivelli, M. Filippini, D. Lunati. Dimensione ottima degli ospedali in uno Stato 
federale 
 
Quaderno n. 00-09 
L. Buchli, M. Filippini, Estimating the benefits of low flow alleviation in rivers: the case 
of the Ticino River 
 
Quaderno n. 00-10 
L. Bernardi, Fiscalità pubblica centralizzata e federale: aspetti generali e il caso 
italiano attuale 
 
Quaderno n. 00-11 
M. Alderighi, R. Maggi, Adoption and use of new information technology 
 
Quaderno n. 00-12 
F. Rossera, The use of log-linear models in transport economics: the problem of 
commuters’ choice of mode 
 
Quaderno n. 01-01 
M. Filippini, P. Prioni, The influence of ownership on the cost of bus service provision 
in Switzerland. An empirical illustration  
 
Quaderno n. 01-02 
B. Antonioli, M. Filippini, Optimal size in the waste collection sector 
 
Quaderno n. 01-03 
B. Schmitt, La double charge du service de la dette extérieure 
 
Quaderno n. 01-04 
L. Crivelli, M. Filippini, D. Lunati, Regulation, ownership and efficiency in the Swiss 
nursing home industry 
 
Quaderno n. 01-05 
S. Banfi, L. Buchli, M. Filippini, Il valore ricreativo del fiume Ticino per i pescatori 
 
Quaderno n. 01-06 
L. Crivelli, M. Filippini, D. Lunati, Effizienz der Pflegeheime in der Schweiz 
 
Quaderno n. 02-01 
B. Antonioli, M. Filippini, The use of a variable cost function in the regulation of the 
Italian water industry 
 
Quaderno n. 02-02 
B. Antonioli, S. Banfi, M. Filippini, La deregolamentazione del mercato elettrico 
svizzero e implicazioni a breve termine per l’industria idroelettrica 
 
Quaderno n. 02-03 
M. Filippini, J. Wild, M. Kuenzle, Using stochastic frontier analysis for the access 
price regulation of electricity networks 
 
Quaderno n. 02-04 
G. Cassese, On the structure of finitely additive martingales 
 
Quaderno n. 03-01 
M. Filippini, M. Kuenzle, Analisi dell’efficienza di costo delle compagnie di bus italiane 
e svizzere 
 
Quaderno n. 03-02 
C. Cambini, M. Filippini, Competitive tendering and optimal size in the regional bus 
transportation industry 
 
Quaderno n. 03-03 
L. Crivelli, M. Filippini, Federalismo e sistema sanitario svizzero 
 
Quaderno n. 03-04 
L. Crivelli, M. Filippini, I. Mosca, Federalismo e spesa sanitaria regionale : analisi 
empirica per i Cantoni svizzeri 
 
Quaderno n. 03-05 
M. Farsi, M. Filippini, Regulation and measuring cost efficiency with panel data models 
: application to electricity distribution utilities 
 
Quaderno n. 03-06 
M. Farsi, M. Filippini, An empirical analysis of cost efficiency in non-profit and public 
nursing homes 
 
 
 
